Paradigm in Default
Wim
Rietdijk
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The absolute
truths of the past were wrong. Not by being absolute, but by being no truths. |
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1. A characterization of the currently dominating paradigm
Let’s look for a number of cultural and socio-philosophical
starting points, such as implicit assumptions and inclinations in various
domains of thought, and reach for a possible concise greatest common
denominator that amounts to a modern paradigm.
First, some history about paradigms.
In
his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(Chicago, 1962) Thomas Kuhn advanced the idea that in all historical periods
there is a (highly coherent) set of rather implicit starting points of thinking
and action: a paradigm. It will be shared by
almost everyone. For example, up to the Enlightenment the paradigm was that God
was the Source of everything, and that the social order and its hierarchies
were consequences of His will.
From
the Renaissance on, and culminating in the Enlightenment, such theological paradigm
got gradually undermined by what one may call “naïve rationalism”. This also
amounted to the idea that everything in the world is defined by local causality
such as demonstrated in the collision of billiard balls. It reached a climax in
nineteenth-century physics.
Two
developments in particular rather radically revised it in turn.
First,
Romanticism, from about 1800 AD on, was a contrasting tendency. It emphasized
emotions, the subjective and the intangible. Second, the revolution in physics
of the first quarter of the 20th century put in doubt various
“rationalistic” concepts such as strict causality, determinism and even the
detailedly articulate objective nature of reality. Inter alia, in some microphysical experiments the outcome appeared to co-depend on
how the observer prepared his instruments. More precisely, the new physics and
Romanticism tended to substitute naïve rationalism by ideas as described under
a) and b), respectively:
a) Positivism, maintaining that only observations (experiments) and formulas
predicting their outcomes and coordinating them are relevant in science.
Neither understandable models of “reality” nor even coherent explanations
matter (much). Also, values should play no part in science and should be
strictly separated from facts; they cannot be derived from the latter. Most
micro-physicists think positivistically and hold that “detailed models of
‘reality’ only lead to paradoxes, and are also superfluous”. They feel much in
the world to be fundamentally uncertain and “fuzzy”.
b) Current “sceptical” romanticism succeeded the more idealistic variant of the
19th century. It contrasts with rationalism by emphasizing the
subjective, impressions, the spontaneous and the incidental (also as to
emotions), and, further, because of its relativism.
These two modern attitudes have in common a rejection of more-than-local coherence: determinism, coherent models, any objective meaning of man’s life,
society or the universe, and the idea of progress. Much in the world is
subjectivized, relativized or “fuzzied”. Uncertainty, unmakability, and
scepticism about “the truth” are correlates. Man-centeredness appears in two
ways: positivistic emphasis on observations as opposed to coherent models, and
in romanticism’s preponderant interest in subjective experience and freedom.
We
can conclude that modern thinking is highly governed by a paradigm that
succeeded naïve rationalism, and which is typified by the thesis: “Fundamental
uncertainty, ‘fuzziness’ and the elusiveness
of understandable models in microphysics, and relativity and subjectivity of
values and of the idea of progress, make incoherence and chance basic features of life and
the world”. We call it the
Relativism-Uncertainty paradigm or RU.
It
is closely associated with some more practical attitudes and phenomena:
1. The here and now get more weight; think of consumer mentality and short-term
hedonism.
2. Modern incoherent art and subjectivistic, man-centered philosophy and
literature (abstract paintings, incomprehensible poems, the
“poly-interpretable”, existentialism, postmodernism,…).
3. Emphasizing freedom so much that duties and responsibility get less
attention.
4. “Nurture” is more important than “nature” and every individual is
fundamentally (genetically and morally) of the same value because quality is
relativized and not in the genes.
5. Such egalitarianism is part and parcel of current solidarity ideology and
political correctness that succeeded religion and nationalism.
In connection with point 5. realize that all solidarity ideologies have one
important shared feature: our “rallying round what we have in common” (which
will often be “the centre”, such as the government). Within this scope,
nationalism has been called “an instrument to make the many exert themselves for
the benefit of the few (that is, the establishment)”.
Note
that solidarity ideologies imply our not (or less) criticising (important)
social actors, that is, sectors of the establishment, which should be basically
accepted as they are. Political correctness even extends such acceptance to
problem groups and what others may feel to be moral and/or genetic rearguards.
Solidarity ideologies actually imply that we should neither be whistle-blowers
as to society as a whole. Here we see an aspect of current paradigm that will
support the status quo: relativism =>
egalitarianism => solidarity => not being a whistle-blower on the highest
level. Note, more fundamentally, that relativism already in the first place
devalues any possible moral criticism of de facto power or situations! It has some
relation with conformism: accept
others, or situations, as they are.
In
all, many have an interest in truth, good and evil to be like rubber rather
than diamond.
2. A curious experience
Practically exclusively, any criticism as to my work
concentrated on a mere few points, in spite of its broad scope and “exposing”
attitude with respect to many social evils, ideologies and theories. For
decades mainly four things were held against me:
1. My rationalism, which was criticised because it would erroneously contain
the idea that reason is more dependable than anything else. Also, I would be
wrong in holding that it does not start from any extra-rational presupposition;
2. My claim that rational argument is in a position to objectively define
values, such as good and evil and, correspondingly, my general rejection of
relativism;
3. My emphasizing the appearance of objective progress;
4. My claiming determinism and that the world is highly coherent, even on the
macro or nonlocal level. [Remark: determinism has been demonstrated by me (see
below), whereas more-than-local coherence is hitherto a hypothesis made plausible by various physical phenomena (see also below).]
The
above criticism can be summarised as substantially referring to my refusal to
accept both relativism and the partly “fuzzy” and uncertain nature of the
universe, in addition to my surmising macro or nonlocal coherence, such as in
evolution, progress and human destiny. That is, one criticises my not
starting from current paradigm. This is deemed
more important than everything else I wrote, about social theory, immigration,
sexuality, art, power and major physical phenomena.
In
actual fact, I partly demonstrated (see below) and partly hypothesized that the
universe and man are not less objective, definite and coherent than reason
and mathematics themselves, according to which they apparently function.
I
conclude this Section by a number of remarks.
The
ideas of 1. – 4. above are far from the essential content of my work, nor are
most of them original. Among others, Voltaire roughly subscribed to most of
them. But indeed they are – almost self-evident – preconditions for much
innovative and critical thinking and producing explanations and theories about
both physics and society. Then, the simplest explanation of the concentration
by my opponents on 1. – 4. I can imagine is the following: One does not like my
explanations and theories, but is not in a position to refute them by finding
faults in my rational argument, and then reacts
by undermining reason and rational argument in the first place (as to fundamental matters), i.e. by relativism, the fuzziness position
and the incoherence thesis. Of course, my personal experience is only a
specimen of what current paradigm is unconsciously attuned to more generally:
emasculating reason so much in vital cases that one can no longer bring
anything important from its place
because of mere “scepticism and relativism”. (For
further discussion on this matter see Sect. 4.)
Compare
with the above “emasculation” prominent Dutch sociologist Anton Zijderveld (in
an interview with NRC Hb., Nov. 28, 1982):
“… substantial thinking on the culture we live in is no longer done by
sociologists, and consequently it is no longer concerned with anything. … It
became a round game that may continue for centuries”.
Concurring
with him is I.L. Horowitz in his well-known The Decomposition of Sociology (N.York, 1993).
3. Current paradigm can easily be refuted by rational argument
*
In my Kennis zonder grenzen (BLIND! No
3, March 2005), and more extensively in The
Scientifization of Culture (Assen, 1994), I
discussed “the network of Galilei, Newton and Einstein” (GNE) as a strikingly
coherent complex of facts, phenomena and their mutual relations. Observations,
rational conclusions and mathematics are vital “components” of GNE. Mankind, or
scientists, collective experience
GNE to appear, just as the sun or the sea. There is nothing like fundamental
presuppositions about it, merely “technical” hypotheses like whether the
Ptolemaean or the Copernican system is the simplest and most coherent. We experience “natural laws” (coherences) to order the world to a considerable
degree, and the observations and formulas are the same for our and Chinese scientists.
If it is all a dream, well, then we experience it as a very coherent,
“scientific”, one. Let’s stop talking about “presuppositions” while nobody can
identify any dubious assumption that underlies the theorem of Pythagoras and
its correspondence with the functioning of natural phenomena! The latter agree
with (mutually tallying) observation and reason. Rare
“paradoxes” as yet appeared to be short-lived or amount to a word play.
The
above means that the integrated complex of rationalism and empiricism (reason
and observation) has a sound basis, unchallenged by whatever competitor as to
knowledge.
* Still, the foregoing does not demonstrate that the world is “non-accidental”
to a larger degree than science could establish up to now. “As yet” the universe
may be fuzzy and human destiny “a mess”, incoherent as a whole. Though
ratio-empiricism does not presuppose anything, it may only define the world and
its order as far as local causality does so. In view of the “uncertainties” of
quantum mechanics, this also leaves more things to chance than 19th-century
billiard-ball physics did, which, in turn, already highly “left to coincidence”
many macro-processes such as evolution and human destiny. The uncertainty and
observer-dependence of micro-physics are hitherto “unimpeded” by
ratio-empiricism.
* In the professional Journals, I gave a number of physical demonstrations
which are relevant here. Four among them in various ways prove that the world –
rather than only consisting of a three-dimensional “now” – is realistically
four-dimensional, the future “already” existing. (The four dimensions are
length, width, height and time.) Four more proofs demonstrate that, in some
physical experiments, retroactive influences cannot but appear: from the future
to the present. This, in turn, implies the future to have influence and,
therefore, to exist. Seven among the proofs are unchallenged, one has been
contested only vaguely-philosophically. In page
Four-dimensional Reality
and its Coherence – an outline of Rietdijk's theory on physics
you can find precise references and also relatively
simple outlines of two among the demonstrations. (The outlines are discussed
with figures 1 and 2.)
The
relevant demonstrations, containing the existence of both past and future,
imply everything to be completely defined.
Inter alia, any uncertainty and indeterminism
of quantum mechanics can no longer be fundamental. Moreover, filling in
quantum-mechanical uncertainty margins may be performed by retroactive
influences from the future. More generally, retroactive influences imply more
coherence in nature to exist in the first place: more mutual influencing. (Cf.
C.W. Rietdijk, Physics Essays Vol. 16, No. 1, 2003, p. 43.)
* The preceding point implies a second basic flaw of the paradigm under
discussion, after ratio-empiricism appearing to be premise-free. That is, it
now appears that, in spite of quantum-mechanical “uncertainty” and possible
“fuzziness”, and in spite of “free will”, the future is defined to detail
rather than being contingent, since it exists.
Still,
the question of how much coherent the four-dimensionally realistic world may be
is still open. Note, however, that the mere appearance of retroaction, jointly
with such four-dimensionality, strongly suggests natural law to be
four-dimensional too. This would introduce a
new dimension of order in nature, transcending local causality. On the other
hand, macro-chaos can be accommodated with an existing future too: it may be a
rather incoherent future. Evolution and our lives may be chaotic, but they
cannot be fundamentally uncertain: there is a blueprint of the future and the
four-dimensional world at all. How much coherent (because of partially nonlocal
four-dimensional laws) such evolution etc. may be is up to further research.
[Physics, in the famous Paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), already
established the existence of nonlocal laws: two mutually distant particles
sometimes instantaneously influence each other. Also note the relation of nonlocal
coherence in laws and processes with the question of “intelligent design”. (See
below.)]
* We now turn to the two core implications of our current paradigm that remain
after the two items – presuppositions and determinism – discussed above:
objective values and the (related) point of objective progress.
Regarding
the former, we can start by concurring with relativism that about none among
the values, “do’s” and “don’ts” of history can be grounded objectively, that
is, be derived rationally. Compare “love your country”, “homosexuality and
euthanasia are wrong”,…
However,
it can rationally and objectively be defined what is undesirable (for you or for me). For example, that our children are killed, or we are
tortured. This does not imply we always deem the same things (un)desirable. For
example, if I buy your house, both of us know that I find the house more
desirable and you prefer the price, and we can act accordingly. All of this
is simply empirical facts. Now we can jointly
optimize desirability by our “buying and selling houses” in the broadest sense,
in addition to my feeling morally obliged to contribute to your “desirables” as
far as mine are not harmed disproportionately. That is, rational ethic amounts
to our jointly optimizing “desirables”: total happiness (with which unhappiness
counts negatively). In all cases in which this cannot be rationally inferred or
intuitively surmised ethics leaves us free: it cannot contribute to a
decision then. The above indeed establishes an
ethic that is only based on experience and reason. As all others are not,
“ours” is demonstrably the best one. This invalidates moral relativism, as the
“economics of happiness” is provably more desirable as a moral basis. For example, it prescribes that euthanasia is good in
many cases. Our ethic comes about by experiencing and communicating our
(individually different) desires and, subsequently, acting “economically”, that
is, rationally. Nothing at all is objectively more desirable.
As
regards moral relativism the problem can actually be “solved in a nutshell” by
the following discourse (The Wall Street Journal,
25 July 1978):
Student:…Values are subjective.
Teacher: No, that’s not true. Some people’s values are better than others’.
Student: No, they’re subjective. No one can impose his values on somebody else.
Teacher:… I say values are not subjective and if you don’t agree with me I’ll
flunk you.
Student: (gasp) What? What?… Are you crazy?
Teacher: No. I can do that. Why not?
Student: Well, (sputtering) because it’s not fair.
Teacher: “Fair”, “fair”, what do you mean “fair”? Don’t impose your values and
sense of right and wrong on me.
Student: (Pause, and eventually) I see your point.
* The above ethic obviously implies that progress in principle amounts to a
long-lasting increase of total happiness. Of course, it is another question
whether such process actually appeared during, say, the past few centuries.
A
rather decisive answer to this, in my opinion, has been given by Ruut Veenhoven
in his Conditions of Happiness (thesis,
Rotterdam, 1984). He found that, in many inquiries, respondents in the West and
Southern Asia or Africa on average judged their own personal happiness should
be marked by 7.5 and 4, respectively. Additionally, medical advance, decreased
poverty, more human rights and a better position of women leave little doubt as
to their effects on the well-being of the average individual. We can even
surmise that the circumstance that many still express doubt as to the question
whether happiness in the West is now generally superior to that in the times of
witch-hunting betrays ideological prejudice, to be discussed in the next
section. (As to moral progress also think of the Red Cross, the general
disapproval of torture and cruel death penalties, the treatment of animals,…)
Finally,
we can conclude that nothing remains of the currently dominating paradigm
except one idea. That is, that on the nonlocal or “macro” level (evolution,
human destiny, nonlocal effects in physics,…) things – though defined in the
“four-dimensional blueprint” – may be “chaotic”, only locally being governed by
ordering natural law. Actually, this question is not “paradigm-like” at all but
is up to be decided on by further scientific research on the factual level.
However, a few preliminary clues appear that somehow point in the direction of
“nonlocally orchestrating” (coherence-enforcing) natural laws:
a) The earlier mentioned Paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen that shows
some specific nonlocal coherence between two mutually distant particles;
b) A striking mutual attuning of various natural constants so as to make life
possible;
c) Retroactive phenomena as indicated above.
4. If the RU paradigm is so unsound, why does it haunt on?
Moral relativism being refuted in Sect. 3, and the
other tenets of the RU paradigm being either easily disprovable (“rationalism
starts from premises”, indeterminism, the non-existence of progress), or
scientifically speaking undecided (the macro-incoherence of the world), one
asks oneself why such paradigm continues to dominate. The more so because the
adherents of relativism are not even consistent: they will not relativize away
the Holocaust by declaring it to be “a mere alternative moral option”. The relevant
continuation is nothing less than a sociological enigma. Far from explaining it
“mono-causally” we give a number of the paradigm’s psychosocial sources:
1) Present-day “descendants” of the anti-Enlightenment alliance of Church,
nobility and convention of the 18th and 19th centuries
still hate reason, rationalism and scientism. Then, relativism, uncertainty,
the poly-interpretable and distrust of progress are more than welcome. For
example, progress should be either impossible, or subjective or depend on
religion or social ideology rather than reason.
2) Everybody loving troubled waters likes uncertainty, moral relativism and the
poly-interpretability of reason. Think of politicians, ideologists and the
corrupted. Actually, current paradigm accommodates to “the political way of
being”: “running with all hares and hunting with all hounds”.
3) Rational values are a threat to ideological
manipulation, e.g., into nationalism etc. They are very threatening to the dominating egalitarianism, because they find many
people to be objectively inferior, morally and/or genetically.
4) Determinism is inconsistent with “free will” and suggests our being
confronted with overwhelming forces of destiny.
5) Relativism, the “premises” idea, “fuzziness” and fundamental uncertainty
constitute the ultimate trick leaving a
way out with respect to any irrefutable argument or undeniable fact. They
work better than censorship and jails. Relativism
actually boils down to philosophising truth and
righteousness out of existence. Then, power, vested interests and prejudice
continue fundamentally unchallenged. Also, fuzziness and indeterminism prevent various “puzzles of reality”
from being filled in to coherent models. We see this happen from physics to
sociology.
Generally,
it is very clear that truth and moral values are less dangerous if they are
more relative, fuzzy, poly-interpretable, subjective, incoherent or
“incidental”! That is, they are less dangerous as to undermining irrational
power, myth, and ideology. Moreover, such truth and values, then, can hardly
serve as a basis for a coherent and inspired alternative to the status quo.
6) In his Die Arbeit tun die Andern
(Opladen, 1975) Helmut Schelsky explained: ideologists will distrust technology
because it makes people less dependent on the supremacy of nature and,
therefore, less inclined to seek refuge in ideological systems. Now we can
radically extend his idea.
That is, not merely ideologists but major parts of the establishment not only
fear technology but – more broadly – everything tending to allow man to
bring his destiny under rational and
moral control, such as rationalism, rational
values, detailed coherence and the idea of progress. This shows one more reason
why RU is popular and why relativism and fuzziness are in great demand. Such
paradigm not merely makes the individual more dependent on ideology but also
on coincidence and “the group”. (Think of
Riesman’s other-directed personality.) The relevant dependence and conformism
will be welcome to many. If man lacks truth, objective values and a coherent
reference frame as a mainstay, he will need the others and the “institutions”
more. The very last thing irrational power and ideology want is the idea that
happiness could be organised via reason and rational values (via systematic
progress). Within this perspective, both evil and the problems of life
should be “complicated”, subjective, relative, “fuzzy”,… rather than depending
on objective factors such as information (science and technology) and genes. Evil,
e.g., should also be “incidental” and incoherent (no “conspiracy theories”!).
All of this makes people more powerless against it.
Within
this scope compare that our cultural establishment not merely does not cease
emphasizing life to be unmakable, but appears to be not in the least sorry
about such human powerlessness! That speaks volumes. Life and its problems are continuously purported not to depend mainly on
clear and scientifically and morally identifiable factors such as ignorance and
concrete social or other evils.
7) Point 6) can also be considered from the point of view of anxiety. In all history, anxiety has been a primary instrument of power and
manipulation. Violence, hell, poverty, sickness and the earlier mentioned
supremacy of nature and the authorities in general produced much of it. In
recent history, most of its causes diminished and, therewith, the
manipulability and conformity of the individual.
It
would have been rational if former absolute and dogmatic value systems and
other certainties (Church, King, tradition) would have been substituted by a
truly enlightened mainstay: rational thinking and values. On the contrary, we
now see current paradigm dominate. Apart from its being correct or not, its
social function to a great extent is substituting the old-time anxieties
(violence, the supremacy of nature,…) by new (less radical) ones reflecting the
basic uncertainties and intangibles implied by the paradigm. For, as we saw, it
does not even offer the consolation of the former certainties. Accordingly,
people still want to belong to as a “defence mechanism”; to belong to “the group”, the right social setting or
club(s). And one will still hesitate to violate taboos or having unpopular
ideas at all (such as criticising the paradigm or the “correctness” of the
day). Anxiety can only be rather intense, as we see how few people actually do
so. Our hypothesis now is that current RU paradigm – leaving life, our values
and our destinies to uncertainty and incoherence – is co-responsible to a
considerable degree.
8) It is not only the establishment that does not like the status quo to be
subject to irrefutable arguments and objective moral obligations, but also many
among the rank and file take refuge in myth, illusion and ideology. Hence many
nationalists, egalitarians and “politically correct” people prefer the paradigm
to rationalism and objective values. To a great extent, freedom to create or
choose their own world and values is dear to them.
The above points make it clear why so many people get uneasy when my work
evidently violates every aspect of the paradigm that underlies a major complex
in both science and attitudes towards life and the world, and defends much
which cannot be defended by reason or rational ethic. Accordingly, the rest of such work is deemed less relevant. It is
sensed that, once one engages into a rational
discussion of the explanations, theories,
social abuses etc. I advance or discuss, this would result in defeat.
Therefore, the all-important line of defence has to be the paradigm. (Not
merely with respect to me, but as to all rationalistic and “over-simplifying”
authors.) If you cannot win by reason, well, then relativize reason in the
first place. Otherwise, you will be confronted with unwelcome conclusions. Conclusions
about (the causes of) social evils, about the (moral level of the)
establishment, about hidden interests behind ideologies, about causes and
profiteers of Zijderveld’s “round game” and about many other at first sight
inexplicable phenomena. Phenomena from incoherent art to why veto groups are
not democratically “overruled” and everybody keeps mum about this.
In
actual fact, in essence current paradigm is not less attuned to the interests
of dominating groups than the one we saw in the Middle Ages, when the paradigm
about everything being caused or willed by God was very pleasant to those who
liked the social order.
5. Current paradigm as an ideological prejudice should be substituted by
hypotheses as far as we need them
As we saw in Sect. 1, the RU paradigm stems from
sources in both the alpha and the beta sector (Romanticism and microphysics).
It is man-centered rather than focussing on a coherent model of the world (such
as the GNE network does). That is, both the subjectivistic nature of Romanticism
and positivism’s putting first and foremost measurements by observers (rather than coherent models) are man-centered. Note here that all of
this amounts to a moderate variant of
postmodernism, relativism being the core link.
On
the other hand realize in this context that Bohr’s conjecture stating that in
quantum mechanics measured object and measuring instrument (and the observer
himself?) constitute “a whole” is neither incompatible with the RU paradigm nor
with the idea of a completely defined four-dimensional model of the universe.
For object, instrument and observer could all coherently contribute to such a
model. Bohr’s idea is simply a scientific hypothesis, to be verified by further
research.
Apart
from its being logically untenable, the demise of RU can also be expected to
result from human consciousness and the “subjective” in themselves becoming
normal objects of science, fitting in the rest of natural phenomena, so that
man loses his “special status” in reality.
Within
the above scope remind that a core difference between the spirit of my work and
that of RU is that the latter starts from natural law leaving many micro and macro phenomena (and outcomes) to incoherence (only “meso” phenomena
being wholly determined by causality, such as a falling stone), whereas “my”
model hypothetically surmises or makes
plausible many more things to be precisely defined by laws and logic, outcomes
and moral values included.
Also,
if we do no longer believe in religion, dogmatic values and myth, we should
look for more rational laws and arguments that substantiate and legitimate
order and values, on pain of our being confronted with much nihilism and
degradation, as we indeed see around us. (For example, think of increased
crime, addiction and short-term hedonism.) The main obstacle for such
substitution probably is that RU, just as the old “absolutes”, is very useful
to many vested interests in its highly frustrating substantial rational and
moral argument, in ways discussed in the foregoing. It is also useful to them
in not leaving the individual any mainstay but “the others”, thus pushing
conformism. (Note that at the same time true friendship is undermined by RU:
friends can no longer call on a common basis of irrefutably positive values and
emotions, which makes their relation more noncommittal.)
It
is also worthwhile to consider a number of practical developments that
contribute(d) to the domination of RU:
1. Disillusion with respect to the old absolutes and “great myths”;
2. The flood of mutually incoherent experiences and information encountered by
the average individual in modern life;
3. Democratization that partly led to egalitarianism which actually amounts to
that merit and qualities discriminating one individual from the other are no
longer deemed very relevant after all, which means relativism;
4. “Relationism” and the network society: man will play many roles in many
relations at the same time, which tends to relativize his values and purposes.
In this context think again of Riesman’s other-directed personality, who is
very “political” and “fuzzy”.
The foregoing suffices to elucidate sources and social effects of the RU
paradigm, and its simply being wrong from a scientific point of view as to
moral relativism, indeterminism, the question of “premises” and the
subjectivity of truth. (Also think of the realistic blueprint of
four-dimensional reality.) Further note that one more characteristic of it,
i.e., its positing “chaos” as to many micro and macro phenomena such as
evolution and human destiny, cannot be decided by paradigms but only by
sober scientific research. Indeed the “chaotists”
are in a strong position, though EPR, the coherence of various natural
constants and other manifestations of nonlocality in physics (such as
retroaction) cause a different standpoint to be far from untenable. Realize
here that any newly discovered physical law or influence tends to increase the
coherence of reality if, such as retroaction, it does more than merely “adding
some decimals” to what we already knew.
The
above results in the conclusion that we do not need any paradigm in the
first place, but only an
optimum extension of the network of GNE. That is, we only need finding facts
and relations between facts, even apart from the question whether life is a
(coherent) dream or not. A priori’s
play no part. Moreover, RU implies an anti-scientific tendency in devaluing
both truth and values, leaving more latitude for myth, the subjective, troubled
waters and ideology such as nationalism and political correctness. Confront
this with ratio-empiricism that can no longer be relativized or “fuzzied” away
in its tendency to expand and “articulate” the GNE network ever more, to an
unknown ultimate extent.
I
feel it to benefit the dynamics of science and the inspiration of its
practitioners (and of all of us) if we substitute the RU paradigm by a merely hypothetical
virtual opposite:
“The universe and its coherence, as to observable phenomena, as to values
(purposes) inherent to it, as to its future evolution, and as to the role in it
of my existence, are much more fascinating and awe-inspiring than we can see up
to now”. Newly discovered laws (such as nonlocal and retroactive ones) increase
the world’s coherence and order and, therewith, at least its potential of being beautiful and impressive, and also of implementing deep moral
principles.
Actually,
however, we need neither paradigms nor hypotheses on these fundamental points
in order to carry on practicing science. But some hypotheses are more inspiring
than others.
Note
that our hypothesis, also embodying that the laws of nature are considerably
more coherent and mutually attuned than we hitherto assume, is somehow related
to the idea of “intelligent design” (ID), which embodies that a “coordinating
hand” guides evolution. In our picture, such guidance is in many laws operating
coherently, in line with the mutual attuning of various natural constants we
already referred to. Such picture contains the “intelligence” and the “design”
to be in the mathematical and, possibly, moral concept underlying nature and
its laws.
Conclusion: We summarise much if we say that
RU – its relativism, “fuzzy-mindedness”, etcetera – has a socio-cultural
function in “smoothing” interactions among myriad different groups, interests, educational
levels, religions, values and attitudes to life. In modern society it supports
“multiculturalism” in a much more general sense than the usual limited one. It
is a more moderate and abstract, but broader, variant of political correctness.
But
it has a price in the way it not seldom functions at the cost of truth and the
morally good, one of its specific drawbacks being that it does not take
seriously various social abuses and special interests that ideologically
manipulate people contrary to the common good. In the foregoing we saw the
price is high. And, moreover, men of science should never acquiesce in truth
not being taken deadly seriously.
As
with most (all?) paradigms, the main source of RU is the establishment’s
preference. In our case it is the latter’s bias towards “unity” and
“solidarity” (round status-quo forces as the centre), which highly means that
all major interest groups, and also individuals, roughly “take each other as
they are”. This, however, borders on conformism because fundamental criticism
of what is prominent is virtually “not done”. (Also think of veto groups.)
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